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INFORMATION SET DECODING OF LEE-METRIC CODES OVER
FINITE RINGS
VIOLETTA WEGER, MASSIMO BATTAGLIONI, PAOLO SANTINI,
FRANCO CHIARALUCE, MARCO BALDI, AND EDOARDO PERSICHETTI
Abstract. Information set decoding (ISD) algorithms are the best known pro-
cedures to solve the decoding problem for general linear codes. These algorithms
are hence used for codes without a visible structure, or for which efficient de-
coders exploiting the code structure are not known. Classically, ISD algorithms
have been studied for codes in the Hamming metric. In this paper we switch
from the Hamming metric to the Lee metric, and study ISD algorithms and their
complexity for codes measured with the Lee metric over finite rings.
1. Introduction
The task of decoding a given code, also known as syndrome decoding problem
(SDP), is a fundamental issue in coding theory. In formula, given a parity-check ma-
trixH, a syndrome s and an integer w, solving the syndrome decoding problem (SDP)
consists in finding a vector e, of weight not larger than w, such that He⊺ = s, where
⊺ denotes vector transposition. Note that such a formulation does not depend on the
metric with which the code is embedded. A well-studied case is that of the Hamming
metric, for which the SDP has been proven to be NP-hard [1, 2]; recently, the same
hardness result has been extended to the rank metric case [3].
The best known solvers for the Hamming SDP are known as information set
decoding (ISD) algorithms, originally proposed by Prange in 1962 [4]. Prange’s idea
consists in iteratively testing randomly chosen information sets, until a set which
does not overlap with the support of the unknown vector is found; the expected
number of required iterations is given by the reciprocal of the probability that a
randomly chosen set is indeed valid. Prange’s information set decoding (ISD) has
been improved through several subsequent works [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14,
15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20]. One of these variants, due to Stern [9], is widely used in
the literature and will be considered in the following, together with the original ISD
by Prange. All these approaches increase the cost of one iteration but, on average,
require a smaller number of iterations. Note that, to solve the rank metric SDP,
the best known algorithms [21, 22] share the same principle, since they are based on
an iterative procedure where the number of iterations depends on the probability of
making an initial correct guess.
The study of ISD algorithms finds several applications in coding theory. For
example, the ISD principle is at the basis of ordered statistics decoders that are used
for soft-decision decoding of linear block codes [23, 24]. Another important field of
application of ISD algorithms is that of code-based cryptography, since the security
of many code-based public-key cryptosystems relies on the hardness of solving the
decoding problem for a general linear block code [25, 26]. Moreover, code-based
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signature and identification schemes exploit similar principles, since the adversary’s
ability of forging signatures and proving knowledge depends on the difficulty of
finding low-weight vectors associated to given syndromes [9, 27, 28, 29]. Code-
based cryptosystems are nowadays characterized by a renewed interest, because of
their intrinsic resistance against quantum attacks. In fact, there is no known way
to exploit quantum algorithms to efficiently solve the SDP: quantum versions of
ISD algorithms are still characterized by a complexity that grows exponentially in
the weight of the unknown vector [15]. This well-assessed security makes code-based
cryptosystems among the most promising solutions for the post-quantum world [30].
All the above examples, however, rely on codes in the Hamming metric. The
rationale of this work is to introduce techniques to solve the SDP for general codes
in the Lee metric. To the best of our knowledge, this has not been done yet, except
for some preliminary work in [31]. In particular, our study can be useful to address
potential applicability of the Lee metric to design new code-based cryptosystems.
For such a purpose, starting from [31], where Stern’s ISD algorithm is converted to
the ring Z4, we extend this work and propose algorithms inspired by Prange’s and
Stern’s ISD to solve the Lee metric variant of SDP for any integer residue ring whose
size is a prime power. A detailed complexity analysis of these algorithms is provided.
The most relevant conclusion of our analysis is that, under certain assumptions, the
complexity of Prange’s ISD algorithm in the Lee metric is lower bounded by that
of Prange’s ISD algorithm in the Hamming metric, reduced by a relatively small
polynomial factor.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the notation used
throughout the paper and give some preliminary notions on the Lee metric. In
Section 3 we formulate some general properties of the Lee metric. In Section 4 we
extend ISD algorithms to Zpm, considering the Lee metric and carry out a complexity
analysis of these algorithms. In Section 5 we provide numerical results and in Section
6 we draw some concluding remarks.
2. Notation and preliminaries
In the rest of the paper we set q = pm, where p is a prime number and m a
positive integer. We also denote with Zq the ring of integers modulo q, and with
Fq the finite field with q elements. The cardinality of a set is denoted as |V |. We
use bold lower case (respectively upper case) letters to denote vectors (respectively
matrices). The identity matrix with size k is denoted as Ik. Given a length-n vector
x and a set S ⊂ {1, . . . , n}, we denote with xS the vector formed by the entries of x
indexed by S; similarly, given a matrix M with n columns, MS denotes the matrix
formed by the columns of M that are indexed by the elements in S. The support of
a vector a is defined as S{a} = {j s.t. aj 6= 0}. For S ⊂ {1, . . . , n}, we denote by
Z
n
q (S) the vectors having support in S.
Classically, an [n, k] linear code C is a linear subspace of Fnq of dimension k,
endowed with the Hamming metric. The size of the code, denoted as |C|, is the
number of its codewords, i.e. |C| = qk. For an [n, k] linear code C over Fq and
I ⊂ {1, . . . , n} we denote by CI = {cI | c ∈ C} and we say that I of size k is an
information set if |CI | = |C|. In other words, ∀c ∈ C, we take the vectors formed by
the entries of each c indexed by I and put them in a set CI . We call I an information
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set if |CI | = |C|. Finally, we say that two codes are permutation equivalent iff their
codewords coincide, except for a permutation of their symbols.
The definitions above can be extended on a finite ring R. For such a purpose, let
h and n be positive integers and let R be a finite ring. C is called an R-linear code
of length n and type h, if C is a submodule of Rn, with |C| = h. Throughout this
paper we restrict to the case R = Zq and call C a ring linear code of length n iff C
is an additive subgroup of Znq .
For a ring linear code C over Zq of length n and type (p
m)k1
(
pm−1
)k2 · · · (p)km ,
where k1, ..., km is a sequence of m integers such that
m∑
i=1
ki = K, we call a set
I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} of size K a (ring linear) information set if |CI | = |C|.
Proposition 1. Let C be a linear code over Zpm of length n and type
|C| = (pm)k1(pm−1)k2 · · · (p)km .
Then C is permutation equivalent to a code having the following systematic parity-
check matrix H of size (n− k1)× n

B1,1 B1,2 · · · B1,m−1 B1,m In−K
pB2,1 pB2,2 · · · pB2,m−1 pIkm 0
p2B3,1 p
2B3,2 · · · p
2Ikm−1 0 0
...
...
...
...
...
pm−1Bm,1 p
m−1Ik2 · · · 0 0 0

 ,
where B1,j ∈ Z
(n−K)×kj
pm+1−i
and Bi,j ∈ Z
km−i+2×kj
pm+1−i
for i > 1.
3. Properties of the Lee metric
For x ∈ Zq we define the Lee value to be
|x|L = min{x, q − x}.
Then, for x ∈ Znq , we define the Lee weight as
wtL {x} =
n∑
i=1
|xi|L.
For x,y ∈ Znq , the Lee distance is defined as
dL(x,y) = wtL {x− y} .
A code embedded with the Lee distance is called a Lee code. Because of the linearity,
the minimum distance dL of a Lee code is defined as the minimum Lee weight of a
non-zero codeword, that is
dL = min{wtL {x} s.t. 0n 6= x ∈ C}.
Lemma 2. [32, Problem 10.15] Let x be the random variable with uniform distri-
bution over Zq; its average Lee weight is
µq =
{
q
4 if q is even,
q2−1
4q if q is odd.
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Let us now compute the multiplicity of vectors in Znq having Lee weight w ∈
{0, . . . , n⌊ q2⌋}, that we denote as F (n,w, q).
We first count the vectors in Znq with Lee weight w and support of size s; this
quantity is defined as follows
f(n,w, q, s) =| {v ∈ Znq s.t. | S{v} |= s,wtL {v} = w} | .
Lemma 3. Let n ∈ N, q be a prime power, w ∈ N such that w ∈ {1, . . . , n⌊ q2⌋},
s ∈ N such that s ≤ min{n,w}. Then, f(n,w, q, s) is equal to
(3.1)


0 if w > s⌊ q2⌋,(n
s
)
if w = s⌊ q2⌋,(
n
s
)
2s
(
w−1
s−1
)
if w < s+ ⌊ q2⌋ − 1,(n
s
)
2s
(w−1
s−1
)
− σ1 − σ2 if w ≥ s+ ⌊
q
2⌋ − 1,
if q is even, and to
(3.2)


0 if w > s⌊ q2⌋,(
n
s
)
2s
(
w−1
s−1
)
if w ≤ s+ ⌊ q2⌋ − 1,(n
s
)
2s
(w−1
s−1
)
− σ1 if w > s+ ⌊
q
2⌋ − 1,
if q is odd, where σ1 =
w−s+1∑
i=⌊ q
2
⌋+1
2nf(n− 1, w − i, q, s− 1) and
σ2 = nf(n− 1, w − ⌊
q
2⌋, q, s − 1).
Proof. If s > w, a vector having a support of size s has at least Lee weight s and
can have at most Lee weight s⌊ q2⌋, which implies that there are no vectors such
that w > s⌊ q2⌋. In the case where q is even, there exists only one element in Zq
having Lee value ⌊ q2⌋, thus if w = s⌊
q
2⌋, we can only choose this element in the
non-zero positions, which can be done in
(n
s
)
different ways. Now we check whether
s− 1 > w−⌊ q2⌋ or s− 1 ≤ w−⌊
q
2⌋. In the first case the vector cannot have an entry
of Lee value ⌊ q2⌋, thus we can choose s non-zero positions, compose the wanted Lee
weight w into s parts and for each choice of a part x, there exists also the choice q−x,
hence 2s many. In the other case, firstly, an entry of the vector could have Lee value
⌊ q2⌋, so we cannot simply multiply by 2
s anymore and, secondly, the compositions
of w into s parts also consists of parts being greater than ⌊ q2⌋ which, however, is the
largest possible Lee value. For this reason, we have to define f(q, n, s, w) recursively.
We start with all possible orderings of the desired Lee weight w into s parts and then
take away the orderings that we cannot have, which are starting from a part being
i = ⌊ q2⌋ + 1 and proceed until the largest part being i = s − w + 1. Thus, we have
to take away f(q, n− 1, s− 1, w− i), repeating this 2n times: factor 2 is justified by
the fact that we have assumed there are always two choices for an element having
Lee value i, and n times for the position of the entry having Lee value i. The case
i = ⌊ q2⌋ has to be taken away only once, since, in the case where q is even, we only
have one element having Lee value ⌊ q2⌋. The case in which q is odd is simpler, since
an element having Lee value ⌊ q2⌋ does not need to be treated as a special case.

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Corollary 4. Let n ∈ N, and 1 ≤ w ≤ n⌊ q2⌋. Then
(3.3) F (n,w, q) =
min{n,w}∑
s=1
f(n,w, q, s).
An upper bound, also observed in [32], and a lower bound on (3.3) can easily be
derived as reported next.
Corollary 5. Let n ∈ N, and 1 ≤ w ≤ n⌊ q2⌋. Then, F (n,w, q) is not larger than
(3.4) u(n,w) =
min{n,w}∑
s=1
(
n
s
)
2s
(
w − 1
s− 1
)
and not smaller than
(3.5) l(n,w) =
{(n
w
)
2w if w < n,
2n if w ≥ n.
The proof of the upper bound is given in [32]. Observe that the upper bound is
exact for w ≤ ⌊ q2⌋. For the lower bound, we only consider the vectors in Z
n
q having
Lee weight w, with entries in {1, q − 1}, i.e., those with maximum support size.
Simple computations show that the addends of the sum in (3.4) are monotonically
increasing iff, for w > 2,
(3.6) n ≥
w2 + w − 2
2
.
Under these assumptions, the following relation holds
u(n,w) ≤ w
(
n
w
)
2w.
The above properties are exploited in the following section, in order to compute
the complexity of ISD algorithms.
4. Information set decoding over Zq
All ISD algorithms are characterized by the same approach of first randomly
choosing a set of positions in the code and then applying some operations that,
if the chosen set has a relatively small intersection with the error vector, allow to
retrieve the error vector itself. For each ISD variant, the average computational
cost is estimated by multiplying the complexity of each iteration by the expected
number of performed iterations; the latter quantity corresponds to the reciprocal
of the probability that a random choice of the set leads to a successful iteration.
Then, for all ISD algorithms, we have a computational cost that is estimated as
O(CiterP
−1
guess), where Citer is the expected number of (binary) operations that are
performed in each iteration and Pguess is the probability that the choice of the set
of positions is indeed successful. We now derive some formulas for the complexity
of Prange’s and Stern’s ISD algorithms, when adapted to the Lee metric.
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4.1. Adaptation of Prange’s ISD to the Lee metric. The idea of Prange’s
algorithm is to first find an information set that does not overlap with the support
of the searched error vector e; when such a set is found, permutingH and computing
its row echelon form is enough to reveal the error vector. Our proposed adaptation of
Prange’s ISD is reported in Algorithm 1. We first find an information set I, and then
bring the matrix H into a systematic form, by multiplying it by an invertible matrix
U. For the sake of clarity, we assume that the information set is I = {1, . . . ,K},
such that
UH =
(
A In−K
pB 0
)
,
where A ∈ Z
(n−K)×K
pm and B ∈ Z
(K−k1)×K
pm−1
. Since we assume that no errors occur in
the information set, we have that e = (0, e1), with wtL {e1} = t. Thus, if we also
partition the new syndrome Us into parts of the same sizes as the (row-)parts of
UH, and we multiply UH by the unknown e⊺, we get the following situation
UHe⊺ =
(
A In−K
pB 0
)(
0
e1
)
=
(
s1
0
)
= Us.
It follows that e1 = s1, hence we are only left to check the weight of s1.
Algorithm 1 Prange’s Algorithm over Zpm in the Lee metric
Input: H ∈ Z
(n−k1)×n
pm , s ∈ Z
n−k1
pm , t ∈ N.
Output: e ∈ Znpm with He
⊺ = s and wtL(e) = t.
1: Choose an information set I ⊂ {1, ..., n} of size K and define J = {1, . . . , n} \ I.
2: Compute U ∈ Z
(n−k1)×n−k1
pm such that
(UH)I =
(
A
pB
)
and (UH)J =
(
In−K
0
)
where A ∈ Z
(n−K)×K
pm and B ∈ Z
(K−k1)×K
pm−1
.
3: Compute Us =
(
s1
0
)
with s1 ∈ Z
n−K
pm .
4: if wtL {s1} = t: then
5: Return e such that eI = 0 and eJ = s1.
6: Start over with Step 1 and a new selection of I.
4.2. Complexity analysis: Prange’s ISD in the Lee metric . In this section
we provide a complexity estimate of our adaptation of Prange’s ISD to the Lee
metric. First of all, we assume that adding two elements in Zq costs λsum = log2 q
binary operations and multiplying two elements costs λmul = (log2 q)
2 binary op-
erations [33, 34]. An iteration of Prange’s ISD only consists in bringing H into
systematic form and to apply the same row operations on the syndrome; thus, the
cost can be assumed equal to that of computing U
(
H | s
)
, from which we obtain a
broad estimate as
(4.1) Citer = O
(
(n− k1)
2(n+ 1)λmul
)
.
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The success probability is given by having chosen the correct weight distribution of
e; in this case, we require that S(e) does not overlap with the chosen information
set, hence
(4.2) Pguess =
F (n−K, t, q)
F (n, t, q)
.
The estimated computational cost of Prange’s ISD in the Lee metric is
(4.3) OCPrange = CiterP
−1
guess.
We now analytically compare the complexity of Prange’s ISD in the Lee and Ham-
ming metric, exploiting the properties derived in Section 3. Under the assumption
that n−K ≥ t
2+t−2
2 , with 2 < t < n−K, from Corollary 5 we derive the following
chain of inequalities
P−1guess =
F (n, t, q)
F (n −K, t, q)
≥
l(n, t)
u(n−K, t)
≥
(n
t
)
2t
t
(n−K
t
)
2t
=
1
t
(n
t
)
(n−K
t
) =
(
P
(H)
guess
)−1
t
,(4.4)
where P
(H)
guess corresponds to the success probability of an iteration of Prange’s ISD
over the Hamming metric, seeking for an error vector of Hamming weight t, in a
code with length n and dimension K. A crude approximation, which however is
particularly tight when t ≪ n − K, shows that P
(H)
guess ≈ (1 −
K
n )
t [35]. Then, we
have
P−1guess ≥
(
P
(H)
guess
)−1
t
≈ 2−t log2 (1−
K
n
)−log2 t.
Since Citer does not depend on the considered metric, this simple analysis shows
that the complexity of Prange’s algorithm over the Lee metric and over the Hamming
metric differ at most by a polynomial factor. For all known ISD variants, the
complexity grows asymptotically as 2ct(1+o(1)), where c is a constant that depends on
the code rate [36]; different ISD variants essentially differ only in the value of c. Our
analysis shows that, for the Lee metric, Prange’s algorithm leads to an analogous
expression. Thus, our results indicate that some SDP instances in the Lee metric
are as hard as their corresponding Hamming counterparts, except for a relatively
small polynomial factor; we leave further studies (such as, for instance, NP-hardness
results) for future works.
4.3. Stern’s ISD adaptation to the Lee metric. As a further contribution of
this paper, we improve upon the basic algorithm by Prange by adapting the idea
of Stern’s ISD to the Lee metric. In this algorithm, we relax the requirements on
the weight distribution, by allowing an information set with small Lee weight and
the existence of a (small) set of size ℓ, called zero-window, within the redundant set,
where no errors occur. Our proposed adaptation of Stern’s algorithm to the Lee
metric is reported in Algorithm 2.
For the sake of readability, in the following explanation we consider an information
set I = {1, . . . ,K} and a zero-window given by {K + 1, . . . ,K + ℓ}, such that
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e =
(
e1 0 e2
)
, with wtL {e1} = 2v and wtL {e2} = t − 2v. The systematic form
of H is obtained as
UH =

A Iℓ 0B 0 In−K−ℓ
pC 0 0

 ,
where A ∈ Zℓ×Kpm ,B ∈ Z
(n−K−ℓ)×K
pm and C ∈ Z
(K−k1)×K
pm−1
. Using the same row-
partitions for the syndrome Us, we get
UH

e10
e2

 =

 s1s2
ps3

 = Us,
which implies the following three conditions
Ae1 = s1 ∈ Z
ℓ
pm ,(4.5)
Be1 + e2 = s2 ∈ Z
n−K−ℓ
pm ,(4.6)
pCe1 = ps3 ∈ Z
K−k1
pm .(4.7)
We want to choose e1 such that it has support in the information set I and
Lee weight 2v, whereas e2 should have a support disjoint from that of e1, and the
remaining Lee weight t − 2v. More precisely, we test e1 = eX + eY , where eX and
eY have disjoint supports of respective maximal sizes m1 and m2 and equal weight
v. In order for (4.5) and (4.7) to be satisfied we construct two sets S and T , where
S contains the equations regarding eX and T contains the equations regarding eY .
For all choices of eX and eY , we check whether the entries of S and T coincide, if
they do we call this a collision. For each collision, we construct from (4.6) e2 =
s2 − Be1 = s2 − BeX − BeY and check if e2 has the missing Lee weight t − 2v: if
this occurs, we have found the error vector e = (eX + eY ,0, s2 −BeX −BeY ).
All these considerations are incorporated in Algorithm 2, where we allow any
choice of I and Z.
4.4. Complexity analysis: Stern’s ISD in the Lee metric. In this section
we derive the computational cost of our adapted Stern’s ISD algorithm in the Lee
metric; to this end, we make the following considerations.
i) The cost of bringing H in systematic form is as in Section 4.2 and it requires
χU = (n− k1)
2(n + 1)λmul
binary operations.
ii) To build the set S, we need to compute AeX and pCeX for all eX ∈
Z
K
pm(X) with Lee weight v; since X is fixed, such vectors have a cardinality
F (m1, v, q). The cost of building S is given by
χS =F (m1, v, q) [(K − k1 + ℓ)m1λmul + (K − k1 + ℓ)(m1 − 1)λsum]
binary operations.
iii) The set T is constructed similarly, but in the first two entries we need to sub-
tract the vector s1 (resp. ps3) from each resulting vector. Thus, constructing
the set T costs
χT = F (m2, v, q)(K − k1 + ℓ)m2 (λmul + λsum)
binary operations.
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Algorithm 2 Stern’s Algorithm over Zpm in the Lee metric
Input: H ∈ Z
(n−k1)×n
q , s ∈ Zn−k1q , v,m1, m2, ℓ ∈ Z, such that K = m1 +m2,
v ≤ min{m1⌊
q
2⌋,m2⌊
q
2⌋}, ℓ ≤ n−K and t− 2v ≤ (n−K − ℓ)⌊
q
2⌋.
Output: e ∈ Znq with He
⊺ = s and wtL(e) = t.
1: Choose an information set I ⊂ {1, ..., n} of size K.
2: Choose a set Z ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ I of size ℓ and define J = {1, . . . , n} \ (I ∪ Z).
3: Choose a uniform random partition of I into disjoint sets X and Y of size m1
and m2 = K −m1, respectively.
4: Find an invertible matrix U ∈ Z
(n−k1)×(n−k1)
pm such that
(UH)I =

AB
pC

 , (UH)Z =

Iℓ0
0

 , (UH)J =

 0In−K−ℓ
0


where A ∈ Zℓ×Kpm ,B ∈ Z
(n−K−ℓ)×K
pm and C ∈ Z
(K−k1)×K
pm−1
.
5: Compute Us =

 s1s2
ps3

 with s1 ∈ Zℓpm, s2 ∈ Zn−K−ℓpm and s3 ∈ ZK−k1pm−1 .
6: Compute the set S consisting of all triples (AeX , pCeX , eX), where eX ∈
Z
K
pm(X), wtL(eX) = v.
7: Compute the set T consisting of all triples (s1 −AeY , ps3 − pCeY , eY ), where
eY ∈ Z
K
pm(Y ), wtL(eY ) = v.
8: for each (a,b, eX ) ∈ S do
9: for each (a,b, eY ) ∈ T do
10: if wtL(s2 −B(eX + eY )) = t− 2v: then
11: Return eI = eX + eY , eZ = 0, eJ = s2 −B(eX + eY ).
12: Start over with Step 1 and a new selection of I.
iv) The average amount of collisions in the two entries of the set S and T is
given by
| S || T |
(pm)ℓ+K−k1
=
F (m1, v, q)F (m2, v, q)
(pm)ℓ+K−k1
.
For each collision we need to compute s2−B(eX+eY ) and check that its Lee
weight is not larger than t− 2v. We exploit the concept of early abort [15],
i.e., stop the computation as soon as the maximum Lee weight is reached.
Since a random element over Zpm has average Lee weight µpm, on average
we need to compute µ−1pm(t − 2v + 1) entries of the vector, each one costing
K(λsum + λmul) binary operations. This implies a further cost term
χS,T =
F (m1, v, q)F (m2, v, q)
(pm)ℓ+K−k1
· µ−1pm(t− 2v + 1)K(λsum + λmul).
So, the number of binary operations that, on average, are performed by an iteration
of Algorithm 2 is estimated as
Citer = χU + χS + χT + χS,T .
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The success probability of one iteration corresponds to the probability of correctly
guessing the weight distribution in the unknown e, which in this case is given by
Pguess =
F (m1, v, q)F (m2, v, q)F (n −K − ℓ, t− 2v, q)
F (n, t, q)
.
The estimate of the overall complexity is given by
(4.8) OCStern = CiterP
−1
guess.
5. Numerical Results
In this section we assess the complexity of ISD algorithms over a finite ring Zq
endowed with the Lee metric, by using (4.3) and (4.8), and we compare it with that
of ISD algorithms over a finite field Fq endowed with the Hamming metric. Notice
that we need to define 0 ≤ k1 < K: the cost of the ISD algorithms decreases with
increasing k1, thus the lowest cost in the Lee metric is given for k1 = K − 1. Some
numerical examples are reported in Table 1, where many different values of the code
block length and dimension are considered and the cost is expressed in bits, i.e., as
the exponent of 2 which provides the work factor of the attack. Notice that, for
space reasons, Hamming, Lee, Prange and Stern were denoted as H., L., P. and S.,
respectively.
Table 1. Cost of Stern’s and Prange’s ISD algorithms in the Ham-
ming and Lee metric, for different parameter sets.
q n K t H.-P. L.-P. H.-S. L.-S.
256 1000 500 40∗ 75.08 73.88 64.13 59.83
256 1000 600 40∗ 87.91 86.10 75.76 70.68
1024 1000 600 40∗ 88.55 86.74 78.78 70.80
243 200 100 50 88.9 75.94 78.30 60.01
256 200 100 50 88.93 75.97 78.45 59.93
256 1000 700 40∗ 104.70 101.84 91.30 85.14
343 300 150 75 121.95 102.33 109.34 82.86
256 1000 500 100 141.85 133.86 125.69 113.53
2401 2000 1600 60∗ 179.99 174.41 166.23 151.80
512 500 250 125 186.60 153.67 171.44 128.44
2401 2000 1600 100 283.35 266.74 267.69 233.79
We observe from Table 1 that, when (3.6) is satisfied (entry marked with ∗),
according with the prediction in Section 4.2, the complexity of Prange’s ISD in the
Lee metric is smaller than that of Prange’s ISD in the Hamming metric by a factor
not larger than t, for the considered parameters, which span finite fields and finite
rings with size q = pm, where p ∈ {2, 3, 7}. The difference is more significant when
error vectors with relatively large weights are considered. Notice that many of the
parameters have been chosen in such a way to reach, or even exceed, the security
levels recommended in [37].
INFORMATION SET DECODING OF LEE-METRIC CODES OVER FINITE RINGS 11
6. Conclusion
We generalized Prange’s and Stern’s ISD algorithms considering codes over finite
rings endowed with the Lee metric. We analyzed the complexity of these ISD algo-
rithms. The assessed values of the complexity make ring linear codes endowed with
the Lee metric a promising choice in cryptographic settings.
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